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INSURANCE COVERAGE ACTIONS: WHO, 

WHERE, AND WHEN TO SUE 

STEVEN R. GILFORD 

ROBERT M. FOGLER* 

INTRODucnON 
Recent years have seen a marked increase in the vulnerability 
of employers to a variety of claims by former employees. In addi­
tion to federal actions for discrimination under statutes such as the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 1967 ("ADEA"),2 the Equal Pay Act,3 and the Americans 
with Disabilities Act,4 a broad array of state statutory and common 
law causes of action can give rise to claims as well. Common law 
tort suits may raise claims under diverse theories including wrong­
ful and retaliatory discharge, breach of contract, defamation, and 
intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
All of these kinds of lawsuits, whether asserted by a present or 
former employee, raise difficult issues of how to defend and handle 
a claim. In addition, these claims raise important insurance and risk 
management issues and require coordination among human re­
source personnel, risk managers, and labor and insurance lawyers. 
In this Article, we review some basic issues that must be con­
sidered in bringing an action for insurance coverage, particularly 
where coverage for employee claims against employers are at issue. 
The Article assumes that the company has already given an insurer 
appropriate notice of a claim and that the insurer has reserved its 
rights to disclaim coverage on a variety of grounds. 
* Steven R. Gilford is a partner and Robert M. Fogler is an associate at Mayer, 
Brown & Platt. Both specialize in insurance coverage and commercial litigation. The 
authors wish to thank Andrew L. Reisman for his invaluable help with the completion 
of this paper. © All rights reserved, Steven R. Gilford and Robert M. Fogler, 1995. 
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
2. 29 U.S.c. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
3. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988). 
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
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I. THE IMPORTANCE OF FORUM SELECTION 

One of the most difficult and significant issues in bringing an 
action for insurance coverage is the determination of where to file 
suit. The issue is critical because the choice of forum normally gov­
erns choice of law, and the determination of which law applies to a 
particular issue can frequently be outcome determinative. 
A simple example illustrates the problem. Assume, for in­
stance, that a large multistate corporation domiciled in Illinois 
purchases an insurance policy from an Illinois insurance company 
through an Illinois broker and that the policy provides comprehen­
sive general liability coverage for occurrences arising anywhere in 
the United States. Assume further that the corporation has a plant 
in Texas and is sued for compensatory and punitive damages for 
wrongful discharge of an employee in Houston. 
Focusing on the issue of punitive damages alone, the selection 
of controlling law may be outcome determinative. Though subject 
to exceptions, l11inois law is generally viewed as not permitting in­
surance coverage for punitive damages arising out of the insured's 
own misconduct.s Texas law, on the other hand, normally yields the 
opposite result.6 Thus, to'the extent it controls choice of forum and 
consequently choice of law, the forum selection process may ulti­
mately determine whether the insured can obtain coverage for pu­
nitive damages or not. 
The importance of forum selection is not limited to the insura­
bility of punitive damages. Controlling legal principles pertaining 
to a number of critical issues in insurance coverage litigation vary 
significantly from state to state. These include the determination of 
what policy is triggered by a particular occurrence,7 whether admin­
istrative proceedings give rise to a duty to defend,s how responsibil­
ity is to be allocated among multiple policies if more than one must 
5. Beaver v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 420 N.E.2d 1058, 1061 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) 
(Illinois may permit insurance for punitive damages based on vicarious liability). See 
International Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Pioneer Life Ins. Co., 568 N.E.2d 9, 15 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1990), appeal denied, 580 N.E.2d 116 (1991). 
6. See American Home Assurance Co. v. Safeway Steel Prods. Co., 743 S.W.2d 
693,703-04 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). See generally BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. 
NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES § 14.06 (7th ed. 1994). 
7. Compare, e.g., Castle & Cooke, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 711 P.2d 1108, 1113 
(Wash. Ct. App.) ("pattern or practice" discrimination triggers every policy in effect 
during the pattern or practice), rev. denied, 105 Wash. 2d 1021 (1986) with Appalachian 
Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1982) (limiting coverage to the 
policy in effect when the injury from the pattern or practice first manifested itself). 
8. See infra notes 72-79 and accompanying text. 
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respond to a particular 10ss,9 the meaning of "expected and in­
tended,"lo and whether insurance for certain conduct is contrary to 
public policy.ll In the context of D&O insurance, different states 
apply different legal principles in determining the extent to which 
defense or settlement costs of a corporation may be allocated to 
officers who are covered by the policy.12 
The diversity of legal principles that various states apply to 
control key legal issues is further complicated by the substantial va­
riation in applicable choice of law principles. If every state utilized 
the same choice of law principles, jurisdictional variations in the 
laws governing key coverage issues would have little relevance to 
forum selection; different jurisdictions applying the same choice of 
law principles would theoretically yield the same results. The fact 
is, however, that there is substantial variation among jurisdictions 
with respect to choice of law principles. 
For this reason, the selection of the proper forum for asserting 
an action for insurance coverage frequently presents a tortuous an­
alytical road. For each potentially available jurisdiction, the puta­
tive plaintiff must first consider the choice of law principles that will 
be applied by that forum and then look at the law of the various 
jurisdictions to which application of the governing choice of law 
principles is likely to lead. The problem is further compounded by 
the fact that under most choice of law principles, different jurisdic­
tions may control different issues in the same coverage case.13 
Thus, forum selection requires a three-step analysis of: (1) where 
the party can sue, (2) what choice of law principles would be ap­
plied to critical legal issues in potentially applicable jurisdictions, 
and (3) which of these jurisdictions would apply the most favorable 
substantive law on each critical issue. 
9. Compare, e.g., Continental Casualty Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 823 
F.2d 708,712 (2d Cir. 1987) (prorating responsibility in the ratio that the insured's limits 
bear to the sum of all available coverage) with Reliance Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Surplus 
Lines Ins. Co., 753 F.2d 1288, 1292 (4th Cir. 1985) (applying the "equal share" method 
of apportioning responsibility). 
10. See infra notes 88-98 and accompanying text. 
11. See infra notes 131-44 and accompanying text. 
12. See, e.g., Nordstrom, Inc. v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 54 F.3d 1424, 1431-33 (9th Cir. 
1995); Harbor Ins. Co. v. Continental Bank Corp., 922 F.2d 357, 368 (7th Cir. 1990). 
13. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CoNFLIcr OF LAWS § 6 cmt. f (1971); In re 
Air Crash Disaster near New Orleans, Louisiana on July 9, 1982,821 F.2d 1147, 1169 
n.38 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc). 
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II. WHO SHOULD BE SUED? 
Of course, prior to beginning the forum selection analysis the 
plaintiff must determine who to sue. For a policyholder seeking to 
obtain insurance coverage through litigation, the basic choices are 
generally limited to insurers and brokers.14 
A. Insurers 
The determination of which insurer to sue is, in most cases, 
relatively straightforward. The policyholder must sue the insurer 
from whom coverage is being sought. In the simple wrongful dis­
charge case, where the former employee is suing for $500,000 with 
respect to an incident or series of incidents that took place over a 
three-month period, the likelihood is that coverage is available 
from only a single insurer, and that insurer is the only logical de­
fendant in a coverage action. 
This simple scenario can be complicated in a number of ways. 
The most obvious complication is when the action involves, or may 
involve, more substantial dollars, and an excess insurer must be in­
cluded as a defendant in addition to the policyholder's primary 
carrier. 
A second complication occurs when the incident at issue spans 
multiple policy periods. In some cases, this may be because acts of 
alleged discrimination span a number of years in which various poli­
cies were in effect. A pattern or practice of discrimination, for ex­
ample, may trigger every policy in effect from the beginning to the 
end of the pattern or practice.15 
A suit against multiple insurers may also be appropriate where 
several different types of policies potentially cover a loss. Consider, 
for example, the situation in which a company and senior officer 
who are sued for wrongful discharge may have coverage from a 
Commercial General Liability ("CGL") policy, an Employer Prac­
tices Insurance Liablity ("EPLI") policy and a D&O Policy. Each 
insurer that issued one of these policies is a potential defendant. 
'TYpically, an insured is well advised to sue all potentially re­
14. Where an insurer is insolvent, a claim against a guaranty fund or a liquidator 
may also be appropriate. Detailed discussion of such claims can be found in A.B.A., 
Law and Practice of Insurance Company Insolvency Revisited (1989). 
15. See, e.g., Transport Ins. Co. v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 1325, 
1327-28 (N.D. Tex. 1980); Castle & Cooke, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 711 P.2d 1108, 
1113 (Wash. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 105 Wash. 2d 1021 (1986). But see Appalachian Iris. 
Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1982) (limiting coverage to the 
policy in effect when the injury from the pattern or practice first manifested itself). 
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sponsible insurers. This avoids the dangers of multiple lawsuits and 
inconsistent rulings and may help to avoid an inadvertent failure to 
sue a carrier from which coverage is actually available. 
B. Brokers and Agents 
A broker on which the insured relied in obtaining the relevant 
insurance is also a potential defendant in a coverage action. Suits 
against the broker typically arise in two situations.16 
First, the insured may have believed it was purchasing insur­
ance that would protect it from a discrimination or wrongful dis­
charge case. The corporate risk manager's files may disclose that 
the broker was specifically asked for this kind of coverage. If the 
insurer has taken the position that it did not issue such coverage, 
the insured may have an action against the broker for failing to 
obtain the coverage that was anticipated. Particularly where the 
broker is ambivalent about the availability of coverage, filing a law­
suit against the broker may create a significant incentive for the 
broker to become more supportive of the policyholder's coverage 
claim. 
A second situation in which it may be appropriate to sue a bro­
ker is where an insurer that provided coverage is insolvent. In 
some jurisdictions, the broker may be sued for negligent misrepre­
sentation or for negligence in failing to advise the insured of the 
risks inherent in purchasing coverage from a particular carrier,17 In 
many states, where coverage is purchased on an excess and surplus 
basis, the broker has specific statutory responsibilities to advise the 
insured of the nature of the insurance coverage and of the policy­
holder's inability to secure protection from state guarantee funds. l8 
A decision to sue a broker should always be made with ex­
treme care. In many cases, the broker knows far more about the 
nature and history of the insurance coverage than the policyholder 
does. More importantly, the broker often controls the relationship 
with the insurers and can be an important ally to the policyholder in 
trying to convince the insurer to provide coverage and in attempt­
ing to mediate settlement discussions. Obviously, the broker'S will­
ingness to fulfill these roles may be undermined significantly if it is 
16. For further discussion of suits against insurance brokers or agents, see Os­
TRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 6, § 18.04; Burke A. Christensen, Insurance Agent or 
Broker Liability to the Insured, 10 J. INS. REG. 313 (Spring 1992). 
17. See, e.g., Carter Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. EMAR Group, Inc., 638 A.2d 1288, 
1296-97 (N.J. 1994). 
18. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 215, para. 5/445 (Smith-Hurd 1993). 
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a defendant in the lawsuit and tactically aligned with an insurer who 
claims that there is no coverage at all. 
If the insured purchases its insurance not through a broker but 
through an agent of the insurer, the insured generally cannot sue 
that agent,19 If, however, the insurer's agent acts as a dual agent for 
both the insured and the insurer, an action against the agent may be 
possible.20 Factors that may affect the agent's status as a dual agent 
include whether the agent induced the insured to rely on the agent's 
advice and whether the agent developed and maintained a relation­
ship with the insured.21 
III. WHERE CAN You SUE? 
Once you determine the appropriate defendants, the next step 
is to determine where those defendants can be sued. The basic ele­
ments of the analysis are similar to those in any lawsuit: Where can 
you obtain jurisdiction over each defendant? Where is venue 
proper? What defenses to forum selection are likely to be encoun­
tered in forums where personal jurisdiction and venue are proper? 
A. Personal Jurisdiction 
Most major carriers do business in most major states and are 
therefore subject to personal jurisdiction under the general trans­
acting business provisions of the relevant jurisdictional statutes. In 
addition, many states' long-arm statutes reach insurers contracting 
to insure a person, property, or risk in the forum state.22 
In most cases, service can be obtained by serving the insurer at 
one of its offices or by service on a licensed carrier through the 
department of insurance in a particular state.23 State statutes often 
provide that surplus line, foreign and alien insurers must appoint a 
state official as their agent for service of process.24 Where a carrier 
is not subject to jurisdiction in a particular state, insurance policies 
frequently contain a consent to suit clause, which obligates the in­
19. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 320 (1957). 
20. See, e.g., Kurtz, Richards, Wilson & Co. v. Insurance Communicators Mktg. 
Corp., 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 259,263 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), reh'g and rev. denied, 12 Cal. App. 
4th 1249 (1993). 
21. Id. 
22. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, para. 5/2-209(a)(4) (Smith-Hurd 1993). 
23. E.g., ch. 735, para. 512-204; N.Y. CIY. PRAC. L. & R. 311(1) (McKinney 1990). 
24. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 215, para. 5/445(10) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (surplus line 
service of process statute); ch. 215, para. 5/112 (foreign and alien insurer service of 
process statute). 
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surer to accept service in any American jurisdiction.25 
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
State courts are courts of general jurisdiction, that typically 
have subject matter jurisdiction over most disputes where personal 
jurisdiction is proper. However, the issue of subject matter jurisdic­
tion may be critical if a party wants to assert a coverage action in 
federal court. 
In general, the only basis for accessing the federal courts in a 
coverage dispute will be diversity jurisdiction. To determine 
whether suit can be filed in federal court based on diversity jurisdic­
tion, it is necessary to list the residence of the policyholder and of 
each potential defendant (a corporation resides, for diversity pur­
poses, at its principal place of business and its place of 
incorporation).26 
Assuming that the $50,000 amount in controversy requirement 
of the diversity statute can be satisfied,27 a federal forum is often 
available for coverage actions involving limited numbers of insur­
ers. As the number of insurers increases, the likelihood also in­
creases that one of the insurers will have the same place of 
incorporation or principal place of business as the policyholder and 
thereby destroy the possibility of diversity jurisdiction. This is par­
ticularly likely to be true if the policyholder is a major corporation 
incorporated in Delaware, because many insurers also are incorpo­
rated in that state. 
It is important to recognize that it is the state of incorporation, 
not the state of licensing or regulatory domicile, that controls the 
determination of residence for diversity purposes. Foreign insurers, 
such as Lloyd's of London, which are not citizens of any American 
state, are subject to diversity jurisdiction in a suit with any Ameri­
can corporation,28 so long as no other defendant destroys complete 
diversity.29 
The determination of whether to sue in state or federal court 
may carry with it important tactical implications. If the policy­
holder wants its case heard in state court, it is obviously important 
to join non-diverse parties as defendants in order to eliminate the 
25. See infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text. 
26. 28 u.s.c. § 1332(c) (1988). 
27. § 1332(a). 
28. § 1332(a)(2)-(3). 
29. [d.; see also Field v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 626 F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 1980). 
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possibility of removal. Another possibility is to sue in a jurisdiction 
where one of the defendants resides. The federal removal statute 
does not allow removal of a suit based on diversity jurisdiction if 
any of the defendants resides in the state in which the suit is 
brought.30 One of the important considerations in deciding 
whether to be in state or federal court is the recognition that cases 
in the federal system can be transferred to another venue,31 while in 
state court the only possibility is a dismissal on grounds. of forum 
non conveniens or transfer within the state. 
C. Venue 
Assuming the availability of appropriate personal and subject 
matter jurisdiction, there remains the question of proper venue. 
The answer to the venue question varies considerably from jurisdic­
tion to jurisdiction. Most jurisdictions, however, have rules that are 
similar to those found in the federal statutes under which venue is 
proper: (1) in any district in which any defendant resides; and (2) in 
any district in which "a substantial part of the events or omissions 
giving rise to the claim occurred."32 In addition, although no ana­
logue exists in federal law, many states have special venue provi­
sions concerning insurance companies. In Illinois, for example, an 
action against insurers incorporated or doing business in Illinois 
may be brought in any county in which any plaintiff resides.33 Thus, 
the law of each potentially available jurisdiction must be carefully 
checked to be certain that a forum is available in which venue is 
proper as to any parties that the plaintiff intends to include as 
defendants. 
.... 
D. Disputes over Forum Selection 
~ 
Because of the importance of forum in insurance coverage liti­
gation, the initial stages of a coverage case are frequently character­
ized by substantial disputes over the appropriateness of the 
30. The federal removal statute provides: 
Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a 
claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall 
be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other 
such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and 
served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought. 
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1988). 
31. §§ 1404, 1406. 
32. § 1391(a) (Supp. V 1993). 
33. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, para. 5/2-103(e) (Smith-Hurd 1993). 
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plaintiff's forum selection.34 
Disputes over forum selection tend to be rather limited when a 
case is first filed in federal court because of the potential for trans­
fer to a more appropriate district. Section 1404 of the United States 
Judicial Code permits a district court "[f)or the convenience of par­
ties and witnesses [and] in the interest of justice, [to] transfer any 
civil action to any other district or division where it might have 
been brought."35 Though it may obviously have importance for tac­
tical reasons, litigation under section 1404 is not normally important 
for choice of law purposes because an action properly brought in a 
particular venue, but subsequently transferred for reasons of con­
venience, continues to be treated for choice of law purposes as filed 
in the original venue.36 
Where the venue in the forum in which the case was originally 
filed is improper, as opposed to merely inconvenient, a federal 
court can transfer the case to a proper venue pursuant to 28 U.S.c. 
section 1406. In the event of a transfer pursuant to section 1406, the 
case is treated as having been filed in the transferee court, and the 
choice of law principles of the transferee court will control,37 
Because of the ability of federal courts to transfer cases from 
one district to another, the doctrine of forum non conveniens is 
rarely applicable in federal jurisprudence.38 Most states, on the 
other hand, will consider a motion to dismiss on forum non con­
veniens grounds where the forum chosen by the plaintiff is "seri­
ously" inconvenient, and the more convenient forum is in another 
state.39 
Courts may be skeptical of forum non conveniens motions in 
situations in which issues are legal and not fact-intensive, and evi­
dence is easily transported.40 Thus, the doctrine of forum non con­
34. See, e.g., DeVries v. Bankers Life Co., 471 N.E.2d 230 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984). 
35. § 1404a (1988). 
36. Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990). 
37. See, e.g., Tel-Phonic Servs., Inc. v. TBS Int'I, Inc., 975 F.2d 1134, 1141 (5th Cir. 
1992). 
38. There may be situations in which the only insurance policy at issue is a policy 
issued outside of the United States by a foreign insurer. In this situation, forum non 
conveniens arguments may be possible at the federal level. See American Dredging Co. 
v. Miller, 114 S. Ct. 981 (1994). 
39. See, e.g., Anderson v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 309 N.W.2d 539 
(Mich. 1981). See generally 1 ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDIcnON IN CIVIL AcnoNS 
§ 1.04 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing the application of forum non conveniens in state 
courts). 
40. For example, in Monsanto Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 559 A.2d 1301 
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veniens is most often applied in coverage cases involving blatant 
forum shopping. 
Consider, for instance, our earlier example in which an Illinois 
corporation purchases an insurance policy from an Illinois insurer 
through an Illinois broker and sues for coverage with respect to a 
wrongful termination case where all the facts relevant to the termi­
nation take place in Texas. A policyholder may attempt to bring 
that action in Delaware because of some belief that it will obtain 
more favorable treatment of its case in that court. Our hypothetical 
case, however, has no connection with the state of Delaware. None 
of the evidence is anywhere near Delaware, none of the parties 
have had any relevant contact with the state of Delaware, and the 
state of Delaware and its citizens have little or no interest in the 
dispute. Under these circumstances, there is a serious possibility 
that a court would grant a motion to dismiss on grounds of forum 
non conveniens. 
Because a state court cannot transfer an action to another ju­
risdiction, the doctrine of forum non conveniens requires a com­
plete dismissal without prejudice, rather than the kind of transfer 
that might take place within the federal system. To avoid pro­
tracted litigation and potential forum non conveniens dismissal, 
many coverage plaintiffs focus their analysis of potentially available 
forums on jurisdictions that have some contact either with the issu­
ance of the insurance policy at issue or with the underlying dispute. 
Mere incorporation or residency is not normally viewed as a suffi­
ciently important contact, in itself, to resist a motion to dismiss on 
grounds of forum non conveniens.41 
E. Consent to Suit 
Another issue that is commonly considered in disputes over fo­
(Del. Super. Ct. 1988), where the court denied the insurers' forum non conveniens mo­

tion, it distinguished insurance coverage cases from other cases: 

Courts recognize that most of the issues in insurance coverage actions are legal in na­

ture. The Court can resolve them with little or no live testimony. If the Court needed 

testimonial evidence the parties could gather the evidence in the form of depositions 

and transport it to Delaware. The original location of documentary evidence thus can­

not defeat plaintiffs choice of forum .... Also, the size and financial resources available 

to the parties substantially attenuates these [substantial burden] concerns. 

Id. at 1307 (citations omitted). 

41. See also Union Carbide Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 562 A.2d 15 
(Conn. 1989) (upholding the dismissal of insured's coverage claim on grounds of forum 
non conveniens, even though insured's headquarters was located in the forum state). 
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rum selection concerns consent to suit clauses. The traditional con­
sent to suit clause provides, in substance, that: 
[1]n the event of the failure of Und,erwriters hereon to pay any 
amount claimed to be due hereunder, UnderWriters hereon, at 
the request of the insured (or reinsured) will submit to the juris­
diction of any Court of competent jurisdiction within the United 
States and will comply with all requirements necessary to give 
such Court jurisdiction and all matters arising hereunder shall be 
determined in accordance with the law and practice of such 
Court.42 
Many policyholders have taken the position that such a clause pre­
cludes the insurer from asserting a motion to dismiss on grounds of 
forum non conveniens.43 In several cases the insureds also have ar­
gued, sometimes successfully, that such a clause precludes the in­
surer from removing the action to federal court.44 
Although these issues have given rise to hotly contested litiga­
tion at the trial and appellate levels, most major carriers have re­
vised the consent to suit clause to indicate explicitly that the insurer 
retains the right to assert a motion for transfer or to remove to 
federal court. For example, policies currently issued by the London 
market provide that: 
Nothing in this Clause constitutes or should be understood to 
constitute a waiver of Underwriters' rights to commence an ac­
tion in any Court of competent jurisdiction in the United States, 
to remove an action to a United States District Court, or to seek 
a transfer of a case to another Court as permitted by the laws of 
the United States or of any State in the United States.45 
F. The Possibility of Arbitration 
A growing number of insurance policies, particularly high level 
excess policies issued in the Bermuda market, include provisions 
42. E.g., Price v. Brown Group, Inc., 619 N.Y.S.2d 414,416 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1994). 
43. E.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 794 F.2d 710, 717-18 (D.C. Cir. 1986), 
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1060 (1987). 
44. Compare Foster v. Chesapeake Ins. Co., 933 F.2d 1207, 1216-17 (3d Cir.) 
(holding that the consent to suit clause precluded removal), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 908 
(1991) with In re Texas E. Transmission Corp., 15 F.3d 1230,1242-44 (3d Cir.) (holding 
the consent to suit clause did not preclude removal), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 291 (1994). 
See generally Foster, 933 F.2d at 1216-17 and cases cited therein, discussing other cases 
involving removal and consent to suit clauses. 
45. See John G. Hanlin, The Traditional Service of Suit Clause: Choice of Forum 
and Law Provision?, 39 FEO'N INS. & CORP. CoUNS. Q. 363, 375 (Summer 1989). 
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that explicitly require arbitration of coverage disputes. These arbi­
tration clauses are typically enforced by the courts pursuant to man­
dates of state and federal arbitration statutes46 and, in many cases, 
international treaties.47 Because of the strong and frequently ar­
ticulated judicial and public policy preference for arbitration, most 
state and federal courts will grant a motion to compel arbitration 
where a policyholder attempts to sue an insurer for coverage under 
a policy that includes an arbitration clause.48 
G. Necessary and Indispensable Party Litigation 
Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the proce­
dural rules of most states require a plaintiff to sue every possible 
defendant or to join every possible cause of action in a single case.49 
Thus, although it may be expensive and inefficient, some attorneys 
consider bringing separate actions in different forums against differ­
ent carriers. The defense to this approach is a motion under Rule 
19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or its state court 
equivalent, for joinder. Rule 19 provides as follows: 
A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder 
will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter 
of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in the 
person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among 
those already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating 
to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition 
of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a practical matter 
impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest or 
(ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substan­
tial ris~ of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent 
obligations by reason of the claimed interest.50 
If a person who should be joined as a necessary party under Rule 
19(a) cannot be made a party, "the court shall determine whether in 
equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the 
parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being 
thus regarded as indispensable."51 
46. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1988); see also, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-336(c) (1993). 
47. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
48. See, e.g., Heinhuis v. Venture Assocs., 959 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1992); Preferred 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 643 So. 2d 1101, 1102-03 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). 
49. See FED. R. CIY. P. 19(a); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, para. 512-405 (Smith-Hurd 
1993). 
50. FED. R. CIY. P. 19(a). 
51. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b). As noted below, not all states include an equivalent to 
135 1996] WHO, WHERE, AND WHEN TO SUE 
Arguments concerning the necessity of joining an indispensa­
ble party are typically raised in coverage cases in two situations. 
First, there may be a dispute over which of a number of potentially 
applicable policies should respond to a particular loss. In the em­
ployment context, this might occur where a policyholder has one 
policy in effect in 1994 and a second policy in effect in 1995 and is 
confronted with a lawsuit in which the plaintiff alleges a pattern or 
practice of discrimination that continued throughout both policy 
periods.52 
Another paradigm for necessary party arguments concerns the 
situation in which there are multiple insureds under a particular 
policy. In this situation, a court may require joinder of the addi­
tional insureds so that they are bound by the outcome and cannot 
contest the depletion of applicable policy limits on a particular 
claim. This situation is most likely to occur where the relevant pol­
icy has some kind of aggregate limit that might be depleted by pay­
ment of a loss. 
The decision of the court in In re Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc. 53 
is illustrative. In that case, a bankrupt manufacturer of asbestos, 
Forty-Eight Insulations, sued numerous insurers for insurance cov­
erage under policies purchased by Forty-Eight's corporate parent, 
Foster Wheeler Corporation. Because Foster Wheeler was an in­
sured under each of these policies, the insurers were concerned that 
Foster Wheeler would not be bound by any determination of cover­
age issues in litigation with Forty-Eight that might result in exhaus­
tion of policy limits. The district court, applying Rule 19(a)(2) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, ordered Forty-Eight to join 
Foster Wheeler as a party defendant and held that "Foster Wheeler 
is a necessary party to this action under Rule 19(a)(2)(ii) because it 
claims an interest relating to the subject of this action, and its ab­
sence would subject the defendant insurers to a substantial risk of 
multiple or inconsistent obligations."54 
Many of the cases on mandatory joinder in the insurance cov­
erage context involve situations where the court has relied on Fed-
FED. R. CIY. P. 19(a)(2) in their mandatory joinder rules. See infra note 56 and accom­
panying text. 
. 52. Compare, Castle & Cooke, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 711 P.2d 1108, 1113 
(Wash. Ct. App.) ("pattern or practice" discrimination triggers every policy in effect 
during the pattern or practice), rev. denied, 105 Wash. 2d 1021 (1986) with Appalachian 
Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56, 62 (3d Cir. 1982) (limiting coverage to the 
policy in effect when the injury from the pattern or practice first manifested itself). 
53. 109 B.R. 315 (N.D. III. 1989). 
54. Id. at 319. 
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eral Rule 19(a}(2} or a similar state court rule.55 It should be noted, 
however, that some states do not have an equivalent to Federal 
Rule 19(a}(2} and require joinder only where "[the party's] pres­
ence in the action is essential to permit the court to render com­
plete relief."56 Necessary joinder may be more unlikely under this 
standard.57 
IV. ,WHERE SHOULD THE POLICYHOLDER OR INSURER SUE? 
Once the potential plaintiff, whether it be an insurer or an in­
sured, determines the jurisdiction in which a suit might properly be 
brought, the next question concerns the identification and selection 
of the preferred forum. This analysis will require consideration of 
many of the same factor!) that must be considered in determining 
where to file any lawsuit. 
A. Are Some Judges Better Than Others? 
There is a series of questions a sophisticated lawyer always 
asks in deciding which of several potentially available courthouses 
should be the forum for a new lawsuit: Does a particular judge or 
jurisdiction have particular biases for or against the parties in­
volved? Are there any rules or procedures of a particular jurIsdic­
tion that are likely to make it more or less favorable to one's case? 
What are the views of potential jurors in the jurisdiction about the 
kinds of issues and the parties that might be involved? (For exam­
ple, a policyholder would be unlikely to want to assert a coverage 
action arising from a racial discrimination case in a black, working­
class community.) Is the plaintiff interested in getting his case to 
trial quickly or slowly, and what is the backlog in potentially rele­
vant jurisdictions? 
All of these factors must be considered carefully and will vary 
from case to case and jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Although many of 
these issues will depend on subjective evaluations and attorney ex­
periences with particular judges and courts, the issue of controlling 
law will require careful legal analysis. 
55. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 716 
F. Supp. 27 (D.D.C. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 910 F.2d 960 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see 
also Seaside Resorts, Inc. v. Club Car, Inc., 416 S.E.2d 655, 665 (S.c. Ct. App. 1992). 
56. E.g., MCR 2.205(A) (West 1995) (Michigan). 
57. See Hofmann v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 535 N.W.2d 529 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995); 
Troutman v. Ollis, 351 N.W.2d 301, 305 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984). 
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B. Choice of Law 
Regardless of whether suit is brought in federal or state court, 
the law of the forum typically determines choice of law principles.58 
In a diversity case in federal court, conflict of laws issues concerning 
substantive matters are normally resolved by reference to the 
choice of law principles applied by the courts of the state in which 
the federal district court is located.59 Although simple to state, 
these hornbook law principles can be extremely problematic be­
cause of the considerable variation in the choice of law principles 
used by various jurisdictions in insurance coverage litigation. 
1. Traditional Approach: Place of Contracting 
In deciding the controlling law with respect to insurance con­
tract disputes, a number of states continue to use the approach es­
tablished by the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws ("First 
Restatement") under which issues relating to the validity of a con­
tract are determined by reference to the law of the place of con­
tracting, and issues relating to the performance of the contract are 
governed by the lCiw of the place of performance.60 
The approach of the First Restatement. typically focuses on 
where the contract at issue was executed and delivered, with the 
place of the last act necessary to complete the contract typically 
being viewed as the place of contracting.61 Although this approach 
is supposed to have the advantage of certainty and predictability, it 
often yields substantial differences of opinion in insurance coverage 
disputes. For example, when an insurer in one state has issued a 
policy through an agent in a second state, who has delivered the 
'policy to a broker in a third state, who has delivered the policy to an 
insured in a fourth state, substantial litigation over where the con­
tract was delivered can result. The situation may be further compli­
cated where the insured that is asserting coverage is a subsidiary of 
the company that bought the policy and is located in yet a fifth 
state. These kinds of situations can yield extensive litigation over 
where the policy was signed and countersigned, whether the broker 
was an agent of the insured, and related issues. 
The complexities of the First Restatement approach are com­
pounded by the fact that, unlike questions of contract construction 
58. 16 AM. JUR. 2d Conflict of Laws § 3 (1979 & Supp. 1995). 
59. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). 
60. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLlcr OF LAWS § 332, 358 (1934). 
61. 16 AM. JUR. 2d Conflict of Laws § 76 (1979 & Supp. 1995). 
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that are typically governed by the law of the place of contracting, 
questions related to the performance of the contract are typically 
governed by the law of the place of performance.62 This dichotomy 
can raise endless litigation about whether a particular issue is a mat­
ter of contract validity or construction, on the one hand, or per­
formance on the other. As a result, the law of one jurisdiction may 
control the issue of rescission, but the law of an entirely different 
jurisdiction might control issues such as late notice and the circum­
stances under which an insurer is relieved of its coverage obligation 
if notice is not given on a timely basis. 
2. Second Restatement: Most Significant Contacts 
Recognizing that the location where a contract is executed or 
an insurance policy is delivered may have little or nothing to do 
with the reasonable expectations of the parties about controlling 
law, a number of states have adopted more flexible choice of law 
principles. The most common of these is the most significant con­
tacts test adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws 
("Second Restatement"). That approach, which is expressly ori­
ented toward the reasonable expectations of the parties, focuses on 
a series of factors, including: (1) the needs of the interstate and in­
ternational systems; (2) the relevant policies of the forum; (3) the 
relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interest 
of those states in the determination of the particular issue; (4) the 
protection of justified expectations; (5) the basic policies underlying 
the particular field of law; (6) certainty, predictability and uniform­
ity of result; and (7) ease in the determination and application of 
the law to be applied.63 
In attempting to apply these principles, the Second Restatement 
focuses on the number of contacts to determine the state with the 
most significant relationship to a matter. The contacts considered 
include the place of contracting, the place of negotiation, and the 
domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of 
business of the parties.64 
The Second Restatement has a special rule for insurance con­
tracts. Under section 193, "[t]he validity of a contract of fire, surety 
or casualty insurance and the rights created thereby are determined 
by the local law of the state that the parties understood was to be 
62. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 358 (1934). 
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971). 
64. Id. § 188(2). 
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the principal location of the insured risk," unless another state has a 
"more significant relationship" under general contlict principles.65 
Unfortunately, the focus on the principal location of the in­
sured risk is extremely difficult to apply in the context of large mul­
tistate corporations. If a California insured with offices and 
employees in all fifty states purchases an insurance policy from a 
New York insurer and has a wrongful termination claim arising 
from its operations in Missouri or a discrimination claim arising 
from operations in several states, there may be no clear expectation 
of the parties as to the principal location of an insured risk. 
Although some courts may tum to the insured's principal place of 
business to resolve the issue, that approach may give way in other 
situations to a more significant relationship with the state where the 
underlying event leading to the covered occurrence took place. 
Several courts have accorded special significance to the location of 
the risk in choice of law determinations.66 
Still other jurisdictions use a governmental interest approach 
to resolve contlicts of law.67 The governmental interest approach 
emphasizes the interests of various jurisdictions in having their law 
resolve a particular dispute rather than the expectations of the par­
ties. Several states, such as California and New Jersey,68 utilize this 
approach. The governmental interest approach often tends to give 
greater emphasis to forum selection and the forum involved in the 
underlying risk. 
C. Key Substantive Issues for Choice of Law Analysis 
Once there has been an identification of the forums in which 
suit can be filed and of the choice of law principles courts in those 
forums use to select controlling law with respect to particular issues, 
it is necessary to examine where the application of the relevant 
principles may lead. In the remainder of this Article, we identify 
some of the issues that may be worthy of consideration. 
65. [d. § 193. 
66. See, e.g., CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 
1211,1217 (1st Cir. 1995); Glowski v. Allstate Ins. Co., 589 A.2d 593, 595 (N.H. 1991). 
67. See, e.g., Stonewall Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 17 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 713,718 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); Veazey v. Doremus, 510 A.2d 1187, 1189 (N.J. 
1986). 
68. Stonewall, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 718; Veazy, 510 A.2d at 1189. For a survey of 
the choice of law theories used by each jurisdiction, see Gregory E. Smith, Choice of 
Law in the United States, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1041 (1987). 
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1. Duty to Defend 
In many situations, the critical issue driving a coverage case is 
the policyholder's desire to obtain prompt insurance payment or 
reimbursement of defense costs. In most jurisdictions, the insurer 
must defend if the complaint at issue alleges some facts that are 
within the policy's coverage, even if the allegations are vague, 
groundless, false or fraudulent.69 However, this is not the rule in all 
jurisdictions. For example, some courts may permit an insurer to 
avoid defense obligations if the insurer knows of facts, extrinsic to 
the complaint, that conclusively eliminate any potential for cover­
age,7o The precise rule governing an insurer's defense obligation 
and the likelihood that the policyholder can obtain a defense based 
on a motion for summary judgment71 may be key elements in deter­
mining the suitability of the law of a particular jurisdiction with re­
spect to a particular case. 
2. Duty to Defend in Administrative Proceedings 
There is sometimes an issue as to how early an insurer's obliga­
tion to defend or to pay defense costs begins in a particular case. 
Many insurance policies avoid this problem by conditioning defense 
obligations on receipt of a complaint or commencement of a suit.72 
These kinds of situations may give rise to significant disputes in sit­
uations where judicial litigation is normally preceded by some kind 
of administrative procedure or demand. 
One of the areas in which such disputes over defense obliga­
tions often arise is in the context of employment-related claims 
where resort to administrative agencies such as the Federal Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") or similar state 
agencies is mandatory,73 
69. E.g., Interco Inc. v. Mission Ins. Co., 808 F.2d 682, 685 (8th Cir. 1987) (apply­
ing Missouri law); Trizec Properties, Inc. v. Biltmore Constr. Co., 767 F.2d 810, 812 
(11th Cir. 1985) (applying Florida law); Thornton v. Paul, 384 N.E.2d 335, 339 (Ill. 
1978). See also OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 6, § 5.02. 
70. E.g., Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 177 (Cal. 1966) (en bane); Cincin­
nati Ins. Co. v. Mallon, 409 N.E.2d 1100, 1105 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980). 
71. See, e.g., Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 555-56 (Tex. 1989) ("Summary judg­
ments in federal courts are based on different assumptions, with different purposes, 
than summary judgments in Texas."). 
72. See, e.g., Society of Mount Carmel v. National Ben Franklin Ins. Co., 643 
N.E.2d 1280, 1288 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) '("[the insurer] shall have the right and duty to 
defend any suit against the insured") (emphasis added). 
73. Under TItle VII, a plaintiff must exhaust EEOC administrative remedies 
before bringing suit in a state or federal court. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f) (1988 & Supp. 
1993). Many state antidiscrimination statutes also require administrative exhaustion 
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At least two courts have held that the duty to defend does not 
extend to complaints filed with the EEOC. In Maryland Cup Corp. 
v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co., the court held there 
was no duty to defend because the policy limited the insurer's de­
fense obligations to suits "seeking damages," and the EEOC can 
only grant equitable relief.74 Campbell Soup Co. v. Liberty Mutual 
Insurance Co., held that an EEOC proceeding is not a "suit" and 
therefore cannot trigger a duty to defend.75 These two cases illus­
trate the most common arguments against extension of a defense 
obligation to administrative proceedings. 
In cases that do not involve rights of employees, several courts 
have found a duty to defend in situations where the administrative 
body is acting "in a judicial capacity." For example, in Detrex 
Chemical Industries, Inc. v. Employers Insurance of Wausau,76 the 
court held that Employers had a defense obligation because an ad­
ministrative board "acts in a judicial capacity when it hears evi­
dence and witnesses, the parties are given an opportunity to brief 
and argue their versions of the facts and present arguments, and the 
parties are given an opportunity to seek court review of any adverse 
findings."77 In environmental cases a number of courts have found 
that a letter from a federal agency can trigger a duty to defend.78 
These courts reason that "the administrative process is part of a 
'litigious process' that triggers the obligation to defend."79 
before a plaintiff may sue in state or federal court. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE 
§ 12965(b) (West 1992 & Supp. 1995); Rojo v. Kliger, 801 P.2d 373, 383-84 (Cal. 1990) 
(en banc); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 775, para. 5/8-1l1(A) (Smith-Hurd 1993); Castaneda v. 
Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 547 N.E.2d 437, 439-40 (III. 1989) . 
..+ 74. 568 A2d 1129, 1132-33 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990). 
75. 571 A2d 969,970-71 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 584 A.2d 230 
(N.J. 1990). 
76. 681 F. Supp. 438,454 (N.D. Ohio 1987), affd. in relevant part on reconsidera­
tion, 746 F. Supp. 1310, 1315 (N.D. Ohio 1990). 
77. [d. (citing University of Tenn. v. Elliot, 478 U.S. 788 (1986)). See also Solo 
Cup Co. V. Federal Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 1178, 1188 & n.7 (7th Cir. 1980) (A "compliance 
review" by the General Services Administration does not trigger a duty to defend, that 
"we leave for another day the question of whether the duty to defend ... is necessarily 
confined to judicial proceedings."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1033 (1980). 
78. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Pintlar Corp., 948 F.2d 1507 (9th Cir. 
1991); AY. McDonald Indus. Inc. V. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 475 N.W.2d 607, 628 
(Iowa 1991); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. CO. V. Travelers Indem. Co., 457 N.W.2d 175 
(Minn. 1990). But see, Lapham-Hickey Steel Corp. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 655 
N.E.2d 842 (III. 1995). See generally OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 6, § 10.04(c) 
(collecting cases). 
79. Avondale Indus. V. Travelers Indem. Co., 697 F. Supp. 1314, 1322 (S.D.N.Y. 
1988), affd, 887 F.2d 1200 (2d Cir. 1989), modified and reh'g denied, 894 F.2d 498 (2d 
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3. Parol Evidence and Rules of Policy Construction 
Different forums apply different choice of law rules to deter­
mine the governing of the parol evidence rule. Although the tradi­
tional view was that the parol evidence rule was an evidentiary 
matter controlled by the law of the forum,so more recent cases tend 
to view it as a substantive matter often determined by the law of the 
jurisdiction whose law controls policy interpretation.s1 
Depending on the matter at issue, it mayor may not be in the 
interest ofa policyholder or insurer to seek introduction of parol 
evidence. In some cases a policyholder or insurer may prefer to 
avoid introduction of parol evidence and seek summary judgment. 
This approach has the advantage of avoiding the time-consuming 
and expensive discovery and trials that often accompany parol evi­
dence disputes on matters 'of policy interpretation. 
One important factor in deciding whether to seek summary 
judgment on matters of policy construction is the extent to which a 
policyholder can rely on favorable rules of construction. Where a 
contract is ambiguous, the policyholder can, in some cases, rely on 
the principle that ambiguous policy provisions must be construed in 
its favor, and the burden is on the insurer to introduce extrinsic 
evidence to demonstrate that its interpretation of the policy is the 
only reasonable one.82 Some courts have refused to apply the tradi­
tional rule of construing insurance policies against the insurer in 
cases that involve a sophisticated policyholder or a negotiated man­
uscript policy.s3 
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 906 (1990), partial final judgment entered, No. 86 CIV. 
9626, 1993 WL 427035 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 1993). 
80. 16 AM. JUR. 2d Conflict of Laws § 132 (1979). 
81. E.g., Transnor (Bermuda) Ltd. v. BP N. Am. Petroleum, 736 F. Supp. 511, 519 
n.lO (S.p.N.Y. 1990). 
82. See, e.g., Sequoia Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 971 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th 
Cir. 1992) ("Where an ambiguity cannot be resolved by resort to extrinsic evidence we 
resolve ambiguities in insurance policy provisions in favor of the insured.") (applying 
California law); Vargas v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 838, 840 (2d Cir. 1981) 
("The insurer bears a heavy burden of proof, for it must 'establish that the words and 
expressions used [in the ins1,lI'ance policy] not only are susceptible of the construction 
sought by [the insurer] but that it is the only construction which may fairly be placed on 
them. "') (quoting Filor Bullard & Smith v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 605 F.2d 598, 602 
(2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 962 (1979»; Springfield Fire & Casualty Co. v. 
Garner, 627 N.E.2d 1147, 1153 (III. App. Ct. 1993) ("When a policy provision is ambigu­
ous, all doubt must be resolved in favor of the insured."), appeal denied, 633 N.E.2d 15 
(1994). 
83. E.g., Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 632 F.2d 1068, 
1075 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 986 (1981). 
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4. Can the Case Be Limited to the Duty to Defend? 
Another issue that must be considered in determining whether 
a duty to defend exists under the law of a particular forum concerns 
the extent to which a coverage case can be limited to an insurer's 
defense obligations. This is an important tactical consideration. 
Most coverage attorneys agree that a policyholder's strategic 
planning should give priority to winning the underiying lawsuit and 
avoiding liability altogether, rather than plotting to obtain coverage 
in the event liability is imposed upon it. A number of insurer cover­
age defenses, particularly the defense that there is no coverage be­
cause the damages at issue were intentional or "expected or 
intended," ally the insurer with the party suing the policyholder. It 
is obviously not in the interest of the insurer or the insured to have 
the insurer developing evidence that may be used against the in­
sured in the underlying case. One approach to this situation is to 
attempt to deal with the defense obligation as a matter of summary 
judgment based on the policy and the underlying complaint and 
then to seek a stay of further proceedings pending resolution of the 
case for which coverage is sought.84 As one court recently 
explained: 
To the extent the declaratory judgment might resolve an issue 
adversely to the insured, it would be inherently unfair to force 
the insured to litigate against the insurance company; under 
those circumstances, rather than obtaining the benefit of the [in­
surer's] resources and expertise in defending against the plaintiff, 
those resources, for which the insured had bargained, would be 
turned against the insured and used to help establish his or her 
liability.85 
Such motions for stay are more common where the insurer has 
commenced the case, but the policyholder can sometimes structure 
the situation by suing for defense and indemnity obligations in sep­
arate counts. The availability of a stay will normally depend on a 
84. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Harris, 445 F. Supp. 847, 851 (N.D. Cal. 1978); A. 
WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES § 8.04 (2d ed. 1989) ("The majority of re­
cent cases ... have held that a declaratory judgment should not be entered if it depends' 
on the resolution of factual disputes that are at issue in the underlying action."). 
85. Morris v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 771 P.2d 1206, 1211 (Wyo. 1989) (citation omit­
ted). See also Hartford Ins. Group v. District Court, 625 P.2d 1013,1017 (Colo. 1981) 
(en banc); Vanguard Ins. Co. v. Townsend, 544 So. 2d 1153, 1155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1989) ("[C]ourts will not permit the insurance company to preempt the resolution of 
fact issues necessarily involved in both suits."), overruled by, 595 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 
1992); State Auto. & Casualty Underwriters v. Gardiner, 370 P.2d 91, 93 (Kan. 1962). 
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combination of the substantive law of the controlling jurisdiction 
with respect to the duty to defend and duty to indemnify and the 
procedural law of the forum state as to declaratory judgment ac­
tions, bifurcation of trials, and stays of proceedings. 
5. 	 Allocation of Defense Costs 
Different jurisdictions apply different legal principles in deter­
mining how defense costs should be paid where multiple insurers 
have an obligation to pay. Some courts allow the insured to pick 
any insurer with a defense obligation reasoning that each insurer 
has an independent obligation to defend.86 Other courts allocate 
defense responsibilities among responsible insurers and may allo­
cate some of the defense obligation to the insured if there are peri­
ods of time it does not have collectible coverage.87 
6. 	 Unexpected and Unintended: Disparate Treatment vs. 
Disparate Impact 
Discrimination cases tend to fall into two discrete categories:' 
disparate treatment cases and disparate impact cases. Disparate 
treatment cases deal with situations in which different groups have 
been intentionally treated differently. Disparate impact cases, on 
the other hand, tend to involve situations in which otherwise neu­
tral conduct has had a disparate impact on different groups. 
Claims of disparate impact are, in general, likely to more 
clearly trigger a duty to indemnify than claims of disparate treat­
ment. Because they usually involve unintentional conduct, dispa­
rate impact cases may involve damages that are "unexpected and 
unintended," so that coverage is not precluded by policy provisions 
that exclude coverage for intentional acts or for injuries expected or 
intended by the insured.88 Disparate treatment cases, in contrast, 
often involve intentional discrimination, which may be "expected or 
86. 	 See, e.g., Nordby v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 329 N.W.2d 820, 824 (Minn. 1983). 
87. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 657 F.2d 814, 816 
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981). 
88. See, e.g., Solo Cup CO. V. Federal Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 1178, 1181, 1184-85 (7th 
Cir.) (finding coverage for unintentional disparate impact discrimination under an "um­
brella excess liability policy" issued in 1974), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1033 (1980); Union 
Camp Corp. V. Continental Casualty Co., 452 F. Supp. 565, 568 (S.D. Ga. 1978) (insur­
ance against losses resulting from discriminatory employment practices not void as 
against public policy); School Dist. No.1 V. Mission Ins. Co., 650 P.2d 929, 935-36 (Or. 
Ct. App. 1982) (suggesting that unintentional disparate impact discrimination is cov­
ered by "errors and omissions" provision in CGL policy), review denied, 662 P.2d 725 
(Or. 1983). 
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intended" and are therefore not normally a covered occurrence.89 
This distinction highlights the importance of the constructions 
of policy provisions that restrict coverage to damage "neither ex­
pected nor intended by the insured" utilized by various jurisdic­
tions. In most courts, the focus of these kinds of provisions is on 
whether the insured expected or intended some damage.9o Other 
courts, however, may focus on whether the act that caused the in­
. jury was intended.91 Where this is the case, an insurer could argue 
that the corporate establishment of a policy constitutes intentional 
conduct, not subject to coverage, even though there was no intent 
to injure anyone at all.92 
7. 	 Intentional Acts Exclusion: Constructive vs. Actual 
Wrongful Discharge 
Policy exclusions for intentional acts may be extremely impor­
tant in wrongful discharge cases. An insurer may deny coverage for 
wrongful discharge on the theory that "the actual discharge of an 
employee cannot be an accidental event and ... there is no cover­
age for such discharge where the policy contains an exclusion for 
intentional acts."93 Thus, where plaintiffs allege wrongful dis­
charge, some courts hold that insurers need not even defend the 
claim.94 
A claim for constructive wrongful discharge is more likely to be 
covered by insurance policies as an accidental occurrence. For ex­
ample, in Vienna Family Medical Associates, Inc. v. Allstate Insur­
ance CO.,95 the insured was sued for "[creating] a hostile work 
89. See, e.g., Union Camp Corp., 452 F. Supp. at 567-68 (finding coverage for 
unintentional discrimination but not for intentional discrimination); School Dist. No.1, 
650 P.2d at 935-36 (same). 
90. E.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kim W., 206 Cal. Rptr. 609. 612-13 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1984); American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 816 P.2d 952, 954-55 (Colo. 1991) (en 
banc). 
91. E.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Salahutdin, 815 F. Supp. 1309, 1312-13 (N.D. Cal. 
1992). 
92. See, e.g., E-Z Loader Boat Trailers, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 726 P.2d 439, 
442 (Wash. 1986) (en banc). 
93. 	 St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Medical Lab. Network, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 901,903 
. (C.D. Cal. 1988). 	See also American Quar. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Vista Medical Supply, 
699 F. Supp. 787, 789-90 (N.D. Cal. 1988). 
94. American Guarantee, 699 F. Supp. at 789-90 (finding no duty to defend for 
wrongful discharge because the policy at issue did not cover "[p]urposeful acts"); St. 
Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Ra\ee Eng'g Co., 804 F.2d 520, 521-22 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding 
no duty to defend existed where plaintiff alleged wrongful discharge and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress). 
95. 	 872 F. Supp. 1509 (S.D.W. Va. 1995). 
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environment and constructively discharg[ing] [the plaintiff] from 
her employment with the intent to retaliate."96 The court declared 
that the insurer must provide a defense and indemnification for all 
claims alleging negligent conduct.97 Other courts have been more 
skeptical of claims alleging constructive discharge and have held 
that in some circumstances the employer can be presumed to have 
"intended" that the employee resign.98 
8. Late Notice 
Although we assume for purposes of this article that the policy­
holder has given prompt and appropriate notice, there are situa­
tions in which a carrier defense of late notice may be crucial to a 
coverage case. There are substantial variations in the law that vari­
ous jurisdictions apply to late notice defenses. Jurisdictions are split 
as to whether an insurer is required to show prejudice to support a 
late notice defense.99 Even in states that require insurers to show 
prejudice, there may be variations in the standard for showing prej­
udice. loo In addition, different courts may afford varying degrees of 
significance to notice received by the insurer from third parties 
96. Id. at 1512. 
97. Id. at 1513. 
98. E.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Medical Lab. Network, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 
901, 903-04 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (holding that because the insured had '''knowledge of the 
intolerable actions and conditions and of their impact on the employee,'" it was pre­
sumed that the employer "intended" that the employee resign). See also the recent 
decision of an Illinois appeals court in Society of Mt. Cannel v. National Ben Franklin 
Insurance Co., 643 N.E.2d 1280 (Ill. App. O. 1994), in which the court held that mere 
allegations of negligence will not automatically trigger a duty to defend: 
Here [the underlying plaintiff's] complaint seeks recovery for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress. However, the complaint sets forth no negli­
gent acts or any facts from which such negligence can be inferred. Rather, the 
acts upon which that count is based are the very same acts which underlie 
every other count of the [plaintiff's] complaint, the intentional discharge. 
Thus, the count alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress does not con­
stitute an occurrence or accident under the terms of the comprehensive gen­
eral liability policy. . . . . 
Id. at 1289. 
99. E.g., Collin v. American Empire Ins. Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 391, 409 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1994) ("Under California law, an insured's breach of these conditions will relieve 
the insurer of liability if it is actually prejudiced by the late notice."); but see Hoechst 
Celanese Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., No. CIV A. 89C-SE-35, 1994 WL 
721639, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. 1994) ("New York law, however, does not require a show­
ing of prejudice in conjunction with proof of late notice."). 
100. Compare Baugh Constr. Co. v. Mission Ins. Co., 836 F.2d 1164, 1174 (9th 
Cir. 1988) (Washington law) with Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Murphy, 538 A.2d 219, 
223-24 (Conn. 1988). 
147 1996] WHO, WHERE, AND WHEN TO SUE 
other than the policyholder.101 
9. Trigger and Allocation 
In situations in which a course of conduct on which liability is 
based spans an extended period of time, there are always significant 
coverage issues about which policies are triggered and that should 
respond. Discrimination and wrongful discharge claims are no 
exception. 
Practitioners familiar with the massive cases concerning cover­
age for asbestos injuries and environmental risks will already be fa­
miliar with the concepts of injury in fact, manifestation, and double, 
triple, and continuous trigger.102 In the employment context, a pat­
tern or practice of discrimination that continues for more than one 
policy year may trigger multiple policies. However, some cases 
have held that the policies are triggered when the injury manifests 
itself.103 
,10. Discovery 
Discovery in a significant coverage action can be contentious. 
In addition to requests for claims and underwriting files relating to 
the policy and claim at issue, the insured may seek sensitive insurer 
documents concerning drafting history, correspondence with rein­
surers, and, in some cases, information about other claims and loss 
reserves. The insurers, on the other hand, may seek confidential 
policyholder documents, prepared in the underlying action or for 
other purposes, that may be privileged., 
a. Drafting history and documents related to policy construction 
Where the interpretation of an insurance policy is at issue, the 
insured may seek documents and other discovery pertaining to the 
drafting history of relevant policy provisions.104 This may include 
attempts to discover documents from files of the Insurance Service 
Office or similar organizations whose forms may have been utilized 
101. Compare American Home Assurance Co. v. Republic Ins. Co., 984 F.2d 76, 
78 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2964 (1993) with Mahone v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 373 S.E.2d 809,811 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988). 
102. For a discussion of various trigger theories, see Armstrong World Indus., Inc. 
v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 35, 49-52 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
103. See supra note 7. 
104. E.g., Champion Int'l Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 129 F.R.D. 63, 67 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); Heyman Assocs. No.1 v. Insurance Co. of Pa., 653 A.2d 122, 128 n.10 
(Conn. 1995). 
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in preparation of the relevant provisions. lOS 
The insured may also attempt to gain access to files concerning 
other policyholders who may have had similar coverage disputes. 
Evidence of positions that carriers have taken with other insureds, 
with respect to similar or identical policy language, may be discov­
erable on the theory that it is relevant to contract interpretation.106 
In significant part, the discoverability of these kinds of materi­
als will turn oil whether parol evidence is admissible with respect to 
policy interpretations in a case in a particular jurisdiction. lo7 As 
noted earlier, different forums may apply different choice of law 
principles to this determination.108 A decision as to whether to ex­
pend the time and expense of substantial discovery into parol evi­
dence and drafting history may have important tactical 
implications. 
b. Reinsurance materials 
One area of discovery that carriers often resist involves corre­
spondence and communications with reinsurers. Reinsurance is es­
sentially the insurance of insurers.109 In many cases, a particular 
insurance policy will be reinsured, either individually or as part of a 
group of policies, by one or more reinsurers, and the insurance 
company will report claims and other relevant information to the 
reinsurer. llo In general, insurers and reinsurers vigorously contest 
the discovery of their reinsurance files and their communications 
with one another.111 The theory is that the reinsurers have no obli­
gations to the insured and that communications between the insur­
ers and reinsurers are confidential communications that are often a 
105. E.g., Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 623 A.2d 1128 
(Del. Super. Ct. 1992); cf Schering Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(holding summary judgment was precluded where "[the defendant] submitted affidavits 
of the drafters of the industry-wide standardized CGL clause asserting an explication 
completely at variance from [the plaintiffs] construction of the contract"). 
106. See, e.g., Independent Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 
117 F.R.D. 283, 286-87 (D.D.C. 1986); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Stauffer Chern. 
Co., 558 A.2d 1091, 1093-96 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989). 
107. See Independent Petrochemical, 117 F.R.D. at 287 n.3. 
108. Id. 
109. For a description of reinsurance and the reinsurance industry, see Unigard 
Security Insurance Co. v. North River Insurance Co., 4 F.3d 1049, 1053-54 (2d Cir. 
1993). 
110. Id. at 1054. 
111. E.g., Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. California Union Ins. Co., 136 F.R.D. 1,2 
(D.D.C. 1990). 
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part of a joint defense,112 
In recent years, a number of courts have compelled discovery 
of reinsurance materials and communications,113 Initially, they rea­
son that reinsurance arrangements are subject to procedural rules 
that expressly permit discovery of insurance information.114 Sev­
eral courts have held that reinsurance information is discoverable 
pursuant to this provision.11s 
Courts have also tended to find that communications between 
the insurer and the reinsurer in the ordinary course of business, par­
ticularly where no lawyers are involved, are discoverable,116 Be­
cause reinsurance files often contain information concerning an 
insurer's views on the underlying litigation, policy interpretation, 
and the availability of coverage, reinsurance files can be a fertile 
source of discovery for an insured. 
c. 	 Insurer discovery: Will policyholder files lose applicable 
privileges? 
Insurers confronted with coverage litigation typically seek ex­
tensive discovery into the files of the insured concerning insurance, 
the original placement of the insurance and the underlying dispute. 
The scope of the insurer's investigation into the underlying dispute 
can be extremely broad and may extend to discovery of documents 
that are ordinarily privileged. 
(1) 	Choice of law and issues of privilege 
The issue of controlling law for disputes over policyholder as­
sertions of privilege is far from settled. The federal courts and most 
states view the protection for work product and the rules on admis­
sibility of subsequent remedial measures as procedural matters gov­
erned by the law of the forum,117 On the other hand, the 
availability of privileges, like the attorney-client or self-evaluation 
privileges, sometimes may be viewed as a substantive matter that is 
112. See National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Stauffer Chern. Co., 558 A.2d 1091, 1096 
(Del. Super. Ct. 1989). 
113. [d.; Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 152 F.R.D. 132 (N.D. III. 
1993). 
114. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2). 	 . 
115. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Continental III. Corp., 116 F.R.D. 78, 84 
(N.D. III. 1987); Stauffer Chern. Co., 558 A.2d at 1096. 
116. E.g., Allendale, 152 F.R.D. at 137. 
117. E.g., Kelly v. Crown Equip. Co., 970 F.2d 1273, 1277 (3d Cir. 1992) (subse­
quent remedial measures); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Madan, No. CV 94-4414-JDG, 1995 WL 
313729 at *3 n.3 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (work product doctrine). 
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determined by an analysis of other choice of law principles.118 
The determination of what law applies is necessarily complex 
in a coverage case, where privileged materials are often prepared in 
reliance on the law of the jurisdiction in which the lawsuit was 
. pending or where the work was done and subsequently sought 
through discovery in a completely' different forum. The situation is 
further complicated when an insurer seeks production of arguably 
privileged policyholder documents, and a court must decide 
whether any implied waiver is determined by the substantive law 
that controls the insurance contract, the law that controls the pend­
ing coverage action, or the substantive or procedural law that con­
trolled the underlying case against the insured. 
The confusion and complexity with these choice of law issues is 
so substantial that some lawyers proceed on the assumption that 
documents prepared in connection with litigation for which an in­
sured may subsequently seek insurance coverage may be subject to 
discovery by the insurer. Right or wrong, this assumption dictates 
that defense counsel and policyholder employees should exercise 
unusual care in preparing documents concerning any matters for 
which coverage may be sought. 
(2) The attorney-client privilege and the work product 
doctrine 
A number of jurisdictions have required insureds to produce 
materials normally protected by the attorney-client privilege and 
the work product doctrine in coverage litigation with their insurers. 
One of the leading cases is the decision of the Illinois Supreme 
Court in Waste Management, Inc. v. International Surplus Lines In­
surance CO.119 In that case, the court held that these protections 
from discovery do not apply to material produced in underlying lia­
bility suits, on the theory that such material was were prepared for 
the "mutual benefit" of insurer and insured, even if the insurer de­
nies coverage and becomes the policyholder's adversary in a later 
coverage dispute.12o Several courts have adopted, at least in part, 
the rule enunciated in Waste Management. Some of them base their 
decisions on the existence of a cooperation clause in the insurance 
contract.121 Others rely on variations of the "at issue" doctrine, 
118. See FED. R. EVID. 501; REsrATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139 
(1971). 
119. 579 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1991). 
120. Id. at 328-29, 330-31. 
121. See, e.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. Employer's Commercial Union, No. CV 
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under which documents may lose their privileged status if put di­
rectly into issue in a particular case. 
Although Waste Management recognizes that documents re­
lated to insurance coverage and any coverage dispute do not lose 
their privileged status, many courts have rejected the rule and rea­
soning of Waste Management but uphold the attorney-client privi­
lege and work product doctrine with respect to documents prepared 
in the underlying case for which coverage is sought,122 The court in 
Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Tonka Corp.123 articulated in detail 
its reasons for rejecting the Waste Management rule: 
To hold that an insurance policy creates a contractual waiver of 
the attorney-client privilege, even when the insurance company 
later sues the insured contending the insured's claim is not cov­
ered by the policy, would completely eviscerate the attorney-cli­
ent privilege. Absent a spowing that the parties intended the 
language of the cooperation clauses of the insurance policies at 
issue here to work a waiver of the attorney-client privilege, [this] 
court declines to follow the holding of Waste Management to find 
a contractual waiver of the privilege.124 
The court also stated on similar grounds that it "finds unsound 
the Illinois Supreme Court's extension of the 'common interest' ex­
ception to the attorney-client privilege."125 
(3) The self-evaluation privilege 
Some insureds have claimed that a different privilege, the 
"self-evaluation privilege," protects certain confidential informa­
tion from discovery.126 The judicially created "self-evaluation" or 
2595 (D. Colo. July 15, 1993); EDO Corp. v. Newark Ins. Co., 145 F.R.D. 18, 23 (D. 
Conn. 1992); CHI of Alaska, Inc. v. Employer's Reinsurance Corp., 844 P.2d 1113, 1128 
(Alaska 1993); Carrier Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., No. 35 23 83, 1992 WL 478585 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 1992). 
122. See, e.g., North River Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia Reinsurance Corp., 797 F. 
Supp. 363, 367 (D.N.J. 1992); Remington Arms Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 142 F.R.D. 
408, 418 (D. Del. 1992). 
123. 140 F.R.D. 381, 386 (D. Minn. 1992). 
124. ld. 
125. ld. at 386-87; see also Rockwell Int'I Corp. v. Superior Ct., 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
153, 156-59 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) ("We ... refuse to adopt the rules announced by the 
l11inois Supreme Court in a similar case, Waste Management."), review denied, 1994 CaL 
LEXIS 5610 (Oct. 20, 1994) and cases cited therein. 
126. For a description of the "self-critical" or "self-evaluation" privilege gener­
ally, see Reichhold Chemicals., Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 522, 524-27 (N.D. Fla. 
1994) and cases cited therein. For an analysis of the self-evaluation privilege in the 
context of employment discrimination cases, see Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 885 F. SUpp. 
1434, 1439 (D. Kan. 1995). 
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"self-critical" "privilege prevents disclosure of confidential, critical, 
evaluative [and] deliberative material whenever the public interest 
in confidentiality outweighs an individual's need for full discov­
ery."127 The self-evaluation privilege has not been adopted by all 
courts128 and many of those who have adopted it have limited its 
application to subjective impressions and opinions, not objective 
facts.129 
At least one court has stated that the self-evaluation privilege 
should not apply in coverage cases where the information sought to 
be protected relates to the insured's state of mind at issue in the 
coverage case: "Without access to the documents which defendants 
seek to inspect, it would be virtually impossible for the insurance 
companies to determine whether or not to provide coverage .... 
Evidence necessary to the determination of whether the pollution 
was intentional and knowing cannot be shielded. "130 Although it 
has not been applied in this context, insurers will almost certainly 
argue that the reasoning of Waste Management and its progeny 
should be applied to reach a similar result. 
11. Public Policy and Punitive Damages 
Some courts hold that even if an insurance policy otherwise 
provides coverage, intentional discrimination is uninsurable as a 
matter of public policy.131 Indeed, in some states, such as Califor­
nia, statutes render insurance for certain types of intentional dis­
crimination unenforceable as against public policy,132 Application 
127. CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 620 A.2d 462,464 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992). 
128. See, e.g., Wei v. Bodner, 127 F.R.D. 91, 101 (D.N.J. 1989). 
129. See, e.g., Webb v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 81 F.R.D. 431, 434-35 (E.D. Pa. 
1978); Wylie v. Mills, 478 A.2d 1273 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984) and cases cited 
therein. 
130. CPC, 620 A.2d at 468 (citations omitted). 
131. See, e.g., Solo Cup Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 1178, 1187 (7th Cir. 
1980) (suggesting that coverage for intentional discrimination is uninsurable as a matter 
of public policy), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1033 (1980); Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc. v. 
Insurance Co. of N. Am., 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 778 (1980) (same); cf Ranger 
Ins. Co. v. Bal Harbour Club, Inc., 549 So. 2d 1005, 1009 (Fla. 1989) (analogizing to 
Title VII, finding intentional discrimination not involving employment discrimination 
uninsurable as a matter of public policy). But see School Dist. for Royal.oak v. Conti­
nental Casualty Co., 912 F.2d 844, 849 (6th Cir. 1990) ("Public policy normally favors 
enforcement of insurance contracts according to their terms ...."); Independent Sch. 
Dist. No. 697 v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 515 N.W.2d 576, 579-80 (Minn. 1994). 
132. E.g.• CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (West 1993); Save Mart Supermarkets v. Under­
writers at Lloyd's London, 843 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (construing the California 
statute); see also, e.g., New York Insurance Department Circular Letter No.6, Insur­
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of public policy to prevent coverage that is otherwise available 
under the terms of a particular insurance policy gives rise to diffi­
cult conflict of law issues that are similar to those encountered in 
cases that consider the insurability of punitive damages. 
Consider, for example, the situation where a lawsuit is brought 
in Illinois for coverage for discriminatory conduct at a factory in 
Texas. The policy was purchased in Illinois through an Illinois bro­
ker from an insurer located in California. The underlying lawsuit 
for discrimination was tried in Texas state court and resulted in a 
multi-million dollar judgment for compensatory and punitive dani­
ages against the policyholder. Texas public policy permits coverage 
for punitive damages,133 Illinois public policy arguably does not,134 
and a California statute renders coverage for intentional discrimina­
tion unenforceable.135 What law governs? 
The question is admittedly difficult, and different courts are 
likely to reach different results. Initially, it should be recognized 
that different jurisdictions may control different issues within the 
same case.136 Thus, even if the policy was delivered in Illinois, and 
Illinois law controlled policy construction issues, Illinois law may 
not control the application of public policy principles to determine 
whether insurance coverage for punitive damages is available in a 
particular case. 
This issue was recently considered by the Illinois appellate 
court in United States Gypsum Co. v. Admiral Insurance CO.137 The 
case involved an Illinois lawsuit concerning coverage for the 
$300,000 portion of a settlement allocable to potential liability for 
punitive damages. The settled claim involved property and prop­
, 
ance Coverage for Discrimination Claims based upon Disparate Impact and Vicarious 
Liability (May 31, 1994), reprinted in Joseph P. Monteleone, Recent Developments in 
Insurance for Employment Related Litigation, Appendix C, in PRACflCING LAW INSTI­
TUTE, Employment Law Litlbility Claims: What You Need to Know About Insurance 
Coverage, 716 PLIIComm 176 (May 10, 1995) (Circular Letter of State of New York 
Insurance Department concluding that liability coverage for disparate treatment vio­
lates public policy, while coverage for disparate impact does not); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 
175 § 47, cI. 6(b), construed in Boston Hous. Auth. v. Atlanta Int'l Ins. Co., 781 F. Supp. 
80,83-84 (D. Mass. 1992). 
133. See American Home Assurance Co. v. Safeway Steel Prods. Co., 743 S.W.2d 
693, 703-04 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). 
134. Beaver v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 420 N.E.2d 1058, 1061 (III. App. Ct. 1981) 
(IllinOis may permit insurance for punitive damages based on vicarious liability). See 
International Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Pioneer Life Ins. Co., 568 N.E.2d 9, 15 (III. App. 
Ct. 1990), appeal denied, 580 N.E.2d 116 (1991). 
135. CAL. INS. CoDE § 533 (West 1993). 
136. E.g., RESTAlEMENf (SECOND) OF CoNFLICT OF LAWS § 188, 193 (1971). 
137. 643 N.E.2d 1226 (III. App. Ct. 1994). 
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erty owners located in South Carolina. The insurers argued that 
this portion of the settlement was not covered because punitive 
damages are uninsurable under Illinois law. 
The court rejected the insurers' argument. Beginning with the 
choice of law issues, it held that "[i]n the absence of a specific 
choice of law provision, the general choice of law rules of the forum 
state, Illinois, control."138 Noting that Illinois applies the "most sig­
nificant contacts" test to determine which forum's law applies,139 
the court concluded that South Carolina law should control the in­
surability of the potentially punitive portion of the underlying claim 
because the underlying case was filed in South Carolina, the under­
lying plaintiff lived there, and the underlying injury occurred there. 
According to the court, under these circumstances South Carolina 
"would have the greater interest in determining whether the in­
sured should be able to recover costs relating to the potentially pu­
nitive portion of the settlement entered into in that underlying 
action."l40 The court found further support for its conclusion that 
South Carolina law should control in language contained in some of 
the policies that provided that punitive damages would be covered 
"where permitted by law."141 
After determining that normal choice of law principles would 
require application of South Carolina law, the court considered the 
issue of whether an Illinois court's application of South Carolina 
law, which permits insurance coverage for punitive damages, would 
violate Illinois public policy, which may not permit such coverage. 
The court concluded that this application was not a problem in 
the context of the settlement: 
[W]e cannot say that the application of South Carolina law will 
have much of an effect on Illinois citizens or on Illinois' regula­
tion of its insurers. Moreover ... South Carolina has a significant 
interest in regulating the insurers who issue policies covering un­
derlying claims which occur in that State, as well as punitive dam­
ages assessed in those actions.142 
The court relied on this analysis to hold that there was coverage for 
the settlement even under those policies that did not contain a pro­
138. Id. at 1250. 
139. But see Allen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 574 N.E.2d 55, 60·61 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1991). 
140. Gypsum,643 N.E.2d at 1250. 
141. Id. at 1251. 
142. Id. 
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vision allowing coverage for punitive damages "where permitted by 
law." 
The decision in Gypsum is consistent with a Texas appellate 
court decision that holds that Texas has a strong interest in applying 
its rule permitting insurance of punitive damages to verdicts en­
tered by Texas juries, even where the policies at issue were negoti­
ated, paid for, and delivered outside of Texas.143 Given these 
precedents, it is likely that an Illinois court would permit coverage 
for punitive damages in our hypothetical case, if it was provided by 
an applicable insurance policy. 
This leaves the question of the California policy against cover­
age for intentional discrimination. This choice of law analysis 
should be similar to the analysis concerning punitive damages. The 
point, of course, is that these public policy issues can be extremely 
important and must be carefully considered in deciding where to 
file suit. l44 
12. Attorneys' Fees in Coverage Cases 
The law varies as to whether a policyholder's right to attorneys' 
fees in a coverage case is a procedural matter controlled by the law 
of the forum or a substantive matter controlled by other conflict of 
law principles.145 Most jurisdictions follow the general rule that in­
surance coverage disputes are no different from other breach of 
contract cases so that no attorneys' fees are available to either party 
in the absence of a contractual agreement or controlling statute.146 
Some states, however, have statutes that permit policyholder recov­
eries of reasonable attorneys' fees under certain circumstances.147 
In addition, there are some jurisdictions in which a policyholder 
"'who is compelled to assume the burden of legal action to obtain 
143. American Home Assurance Co. v. Safeway Steel Prod. Co., 743 S.W.2d 693 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1987), reh'g denied, (1988). 
144. See Mencor Enters., Inc. v. Hets Equities Corp., 235 Cal. Rptr. 464, 466 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1987) (California courts will apply California law if applying the law of other 
jurisdictions would violate strong California public policy). 
145. See, e.g., EI Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Amoco Prod. Co., No. CIY. A. 12083, 
1994 WL 728816, at *4-*5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 1994) (attorneys' fees are substantive in 
nature when prescribed by statute); Du-Wel Prods., Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 
565 A.2d 1113, 1120 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (attorneys' fees are procedural in 
nature), cert. denied, 583 A.2d 316 (NJ. 1990). 
146. See, e.g., Kremers-Urban Co. v. American Employers Ins. Co., 351 N.W.2d 
156, 167-69 (Wis. 1984) (refusing to depart from American rule that parties pay their 
own attorneys' fees absent a contractual or statutory provision to the contrary). 
147. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2436-A (West 1994). See also 
infra notes 149-58 and accompanying text. 
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the benefit of its insurance contract is entitled to attorney fees' 
whether or not the insurance policy contains a provision for such 
fees."148 Obviously, the availability of attorneys' fees is an impor­
tant bargaining point and financial issue that deserves consideration 
in any coverage case. 
13. 	 Consequential Damages, Special Remedies, Bad Faith 
Actions, and Unfair Trade Practice Statutes 
Suits for insurance coverage normally are based on a breach of 
contract theory. Although contract actions may allow recovery of 
consequential damages, such as attorneys' fees expended on the 
coverage case,149 they are not normally conducive to claims for pu­
nitive or enhanced damages.15o 
There are, however, some situations in which certain jurisdic­
tions offer special remedies in coverage cases. For example, some 
states recognize special remedies for breach of a duty to defend or 
for a refusal to settle within policy limits. In Fragman Construction 
Co. v. Preston Construction Co., for example, the court held that 
insurers that breach their duty to defend may be estopped from as­
serting coverage defenses such as late notice,151 Similarly, as a co­
rollary of traditional principles of consequential damages, most 
jurisdictions hold that an insurer that refuses to settle within policy 
limits may be held responsible for damages in excess of policy lim­
its, in the event the case must be tried and liability is imposed as a 
result,152 
In addition to these contract law theories, various states have 
recognized actions for bad faith that may result in punitive dam­
ages, particularly when the conduct of the insurer either is espe­
cially dishonest or affects the general public.153 To the extent those 
148. Public Util. Dist. No.1 v. International Ins. Co., 881 P.2d 1020, 1034 (Wash. 
1994) (en bane) (quoting Olympic Steamship Co. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 673, 
682 (Wash. 1991». 
149. 	 See, e.g., Hegler v. Gulf Ins. Co., 243 S.E.2d 443 (S.C. 1978). 
150. 	 See, e.g., DiBlasi v. Aetna Life & casualty Ins. Co., 542 N.Y.S.2d 187,192 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (no punitive damages even if breach of contract was wilful and 
without justification). 
151. 274 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971) ("If potential coverage was present, 
Aetna breached its duty to defend and is estopped from raising any exclusionary cover­
age defenses ...."). 
152. See, e.g., Walbrook Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 7 cal. Rptr. 2d 513, 
517 (cal. Ct. App. 1992). 
153. See, e.g., DiBlasi, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 192 (high degree of dishonesty or moral 
turpitude implies criminal indifference to civil obligations); Samovar of Russia Jewelry 
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actions sound in tort rather than in contract,IS4 they are often con­
trolled by the law of the jurisdiction where the wrong occurred. ISS 
Tort law choice of law principles may yield a different controlling 
law than application of the choice of law principles applicable to 
contract cases. 
In addition to bad faith cases, many jurisdictions have statutory 
provisions that provide special statutory causes of action and reme­
dies for insurer failures to honor insurance contracts.IS6 In most 
cases, the statute itself sets forth the situations in which it will be 
applicable.ls7 The Maine statute governing unfair claims practices, 
for example, applies on its face only to certain misrepresentations, 
failures to acknowledge and review claims within a reasonable time 
following written notice of a claim, threats to appeal arbitration 
awards solely to compel lesser settlements, or failures to affirm cov­
erage, reserve appropriate defenses, or deny coverage within a rea­
sonable time after receiving proof of loss forms.lss 
An attorney for a client that has been denied insurance cover­
age should carefully consider the extent to which consequential 
damages, attorneys' fees or multiple or enhanced damages may be 
available to his client under the law of potentially available 
jurisdictions. 
V. WHEN CAN You SUE? 
In some cases, where an insured has an indemnity policy and 
has paid out defense costs or an adverse judgment or settlement, 
there is little question of the policyholder's right to sue for recov­
ery. The analysis may be more difficult where an insurer is acting 
under a reservation of rights, and the insured is not yet in a position 
to make a demand for payment. 
The traditional rule in federal court and in most state courts is 
that there must be an actual controversy to support a declaratory 
judgment action.IS9 For this reason, the courts, in general, will not 
Antique Corp. v. Generali, 476 N.Y.S.2d 869,873 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) ("fraudulent, 
criminal or dishonest acts by the insurer concerning or affecting the general public"). 
154. See, e.g., Judge Trucking Co. v. Estate of Cooper, CIY. A. Nos. 92C-03-041, 
93C-04-023, 93C-07-025, 1994 WL 680029, at *3-*4 (De\. Super. Ct. Sept. 19, 1994). 
155. [d. 
156. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 33-4-6 (1992 & Supp. 1995); ME. REv. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2436-A (West 1994). 
157. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 33-4-6 (1992 & Supp. 1995); ME. REv. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2436-A (West 1994). 
158. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2436-A (West 1994). 
159. E.g., Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Winchester Homes, Inc., 15 F.3d 371, 375 (4th Cir. 
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permit an insurer to file a declaratory judgment action where the 
insurer has made no clear demand for coverage. As the court ex­
plained in Atlanta International Insurance Co. v. Atchison, Topeka 
& Santa Fe Railway. Co., 160 
[1]n cases where ... all determinative facts giving rise to the po­
tential policy coverage dispute have occurred prior to the initial 
demand upon the insurance company, no actual controversy 
arises among the parties until such time as the issuing company is 
called upon to either payor defend a claim on behalf of its in­
sured under the terms of the policy in question.161 
Most courts give strong deference to the first forum to assume 
jurisdiction over a case.162 Because the choice of forum also con­
trols choice of law and may be outcome determinative, the decision 
of when a decision is sufficiently ripe to support a lawsuit requires 
careful consideration and analysis. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Suits for insurance coverage present wide variations in degrees 
of complexity. Because of the diverse principles that govern critical 
legal issues, forum selection may be particularly crucial. The com­
plexity of forum selection in a coverage case is often compounded 
by issues of jurisdiction and venue and variations in the choice of 
law principles employed by various courts. 
. As a result, like any significant commercial litigation, such 
cases require careful planning and analysis. The failure to consider 
carefully where suit can be brought and the likely course of events 
in a particular forum can lead to unanticipated outcomes and unfor­
tunate, unforeseen results. 
1994); City of Elgin v. County of Cook, 629 N.E.2d 86, 94 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993), affd in 
part and rev'd in part, 1995 WL 646541 (Ill. Nov. 2, 1995). 
160. 938 F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 1991) (applying Illinois law). 
161. Id. at 83 (quoting Gibraltar Ins. Co. v. Varkalis, 263 N.E.2d 823, 826 (Ill. 
1970». 
162. E.g., Admiral Ins. Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 848 S.W.2d 
251,255 (Tex. App. 1993), reh'g overruled (1993), error denied (1994). 
